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INSTALLMENT SELLING IN COLORADO AND
NEEDED LEGISLATION
J. GLENN

DONALPSON of the

Draver Bar

Installment selling is generally understood to mean the process
of selling goods or services, with or without immediate part payment, on a contract by which the purchaser agrees to pay the
purchase price in regular, periodic installments, either to the
seller or to some other agency which may acquire the deferred
payment contract.
While this form of selling was known and used in America
to a limited extent a century and a half ago, it has enjoyed significant popularity only during the last thirty years. The extension of installment payment techniques to a wider field of consumers is attributable to a combination of circumstances. The
automobile, the electric washer, and the suction cleaner was in-'
troduced and perfected during the period immediately preceding
World War I. The war-was accompanied by a substantial increase
in real wages, which brought these goods within budgetary reach
of a large part of the population. But the expansion of sales was,
at the same time, limited by war-time restrictions on production,
by disruptive price changes between 1919 and 1921, and by inadequate facilities for financing installment sales. The exploitation of this new market was, therefore, largely postponed until
after 1921, when the rapid growth of installment finance agencies
made possible a substantial expansion of credit sales of these
goods. American inventive and productive genius has, in succeeding years, added numerous other mechanical gadgets to the consumers buying lists, and the installment payment device, plus
modern advertising, has eased such goods into millions of American homes to the joy, comfort and well-being of the great majority of us.
When we consider installment selling, we are in the realm
of big business. I have touched briefly upon its beginning in
America. A few statistics show its present magnitude. As of
December 31, 1950, the last full year for which figures are available, total installment credit-not total consumer credit which
would include single payment loans, charge accounts, etc.This
but total installment credit amount to $13,459,000,000.
is broken down into installment sales credit, with which this
article deals, of $7,904,000,000, and $5,555,000,000 in installment
loans. One further breakdown is pertinent. Installment sales
credit is made up of $4,126,000,000 of automobile paper and
$3,778,000,000 in other forms of installment sales, i. e., furniture,
jewelry, appliances, etc. The year 1951, through November 30,
was running ahead of 1950.
It is not surprising that a business which has grown so tremendously during a comparatively few years should experience
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some growing pains. If it were that and nothing more, the handsoff legislative policy of the pre-thirties would continue to be justifiable. In late years, however, it has become generally recognized
that the stupendous growth of consumer credit since 1921 brought
new forces to bear on our national economy. These forces, while
not alone sufficient to direct our economy, did possess power to
materially accentuate tendencies toward an increase or decrease
in the nation's purchasing power. Such influence could not be
harnessed by the individual action of forty-eight state legislatures;
it called for control by the central banking system which had its
fingers constantly on the pulse of the over-all national economy
and possessed authority to liberalize or restrict such controls as
the needs of the moment required in the interest of economic
stability. If World War II had not intervened, this call for federal
treatment of the problem would undoubtedly have gone unanswered for several years at least. However, when it appeared
that war was inevitable and business as usual must soon be abandoned, Washington wisely included the regulation of consumer
credit in its fiscal and economic program. This action took form
in Regulation W, of the Federal Reserve Board, issued September 1, 1941, under a Presidential order of the preceding month.
Several times amended, Regulation W exercises control over installment financing, principally through its regulation of the
amount of the down payment and the time of repayment. The
federal regulation relates principally to the monetary and economic
phases of the business in their relationship to the national economy. State legislation, on the other hand, should be remedial in
character. It should be directed toward balancing the bargaining
power between the individual installment buyer and seller for
the same reasons that have prompted the majority of states to
protect the patrons of cash-lending agencies from the more experienced lenders.
RECENTLY ENACTED INSTALLMENT SELLING LEGISLATION.

Social policy in its relation to installment selling has been
expressed in a wide variety of legislation in the United States. In
some states, the parties to the installment contract are governed
simply by the laws which apply to commercial transactions generally, i. e., the statutory and common laws relating to frauds,
negotiable instruments, sales, etc. In other states progress beyond this initial stage has been made in varying degrees. Specific
instruments of security used in credit selling (conditional sales
contracts, chattel mortgages, wage assignments, etc.) have been
made the subject of special legislation designed to eliminate certain practices and encourage others. However, much of the legislation of this type predates either the period of general extension of installment credit to virtually all classes of consumers
or the full awakening of social consciousness to the need for
protecting some citizens against others in commercial bargaining.
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Where such legislation applies to all installment transactions,
irrespective of the amounts involved, the status of the buyer, or
the types of goods purchased, it is seriously in need of re-examination today.
In recent years legislative emphasis in this country has been
slowly moving toward the further protection of at least certain
classes of installment buyers in their purchase of the modern
necessities of life, such as the automobile, household goods and
appliances. Being in a stage of flux, there is little unanimity
in respect to what form state assistance should take. There are
those who advocate minor adjustments in our existing law. Some
conform to the premise inherent in most of our general laws
that, given a right and remedy, the individual can and should
enforce his right in court. This group contends for a "disclosure
law", i. e., a law which compels the seller to make full disclosure
of the principal provisions of the installment agreement and
which expressly forbids the use of objectionable contract clauses.
Others contend that the vast majority of consumers are poorly
equipped to avoid the infliction of a wrong or obtain its redress
even though the unethical seller acts in defiance of law. The lastnamed group advocates an extension of the protection to include
licensing and supervision of the industry by a state administrative agency.
Installment selling legislation in this country applies only
to installment transactions in which security is taken or title
reserved by the seller for the payment of the purchase price. This
security is taken in one of several forms. Most popular is the
conditional sales contract. A few states, mainly because of early
judicial prejudice against the conditional sales contract, favor
the use of the chattel mortgage to secure payment of deferred
balances. Colorado is in this latter group. Time selling is carried
on under the bailment lease in Pennsylvania.
LEGISLATIVE NEEDS IN COLORADO.

In 1951, the Retail Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act was
adopted by our Legislature. It was logical that the first step,
and in fact the only step taken to date by Colorado to regulate
retail installment selling, occurred in the field of car sales, as
it was this field in which abuses were most prevalent.
Agitation for remedial legislation in respect to other subjects
of installment sales and the revision of our Chattel Mortgage Act
can be expected to develop in time. The occurrence of one of two
events, 1) unemployment perhaps resulting from peace-defense
switchovers, or 2) over extension of credit, even in an inflationary
cycle, in face of the large installment debt outstanding, could
hasten public awareness of the legislative needs in these two
areas. I wonder how significant an economist would view reliable
weekly reports showing a repossession rate of approximately ten
percent of cars sold?
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We know that in Colorado, conditional sales contracts are
frowned upon as secret liens by our courts, and security in time
sales is therefore taken in the form of a chattel mortgage. The
inadequacies of our Chattel Mortgage Act are too well known to
merit extended consideration. In the main, that legislation speaks
of 1917 and antedates the widespread popularity of installment
selling and the peculiar problems created thereby. No statutory
form of mortgage is provided and one-sided draftsmanship of
the securing instrument naturally results. This is restricted only by
the slowly developing case law process. The most glaring inadequacy of the Chattel Mortgage Act is its complete silence in respect to foreclosure procedures. This omission is much more
serious to the buyer of consumer goods, i. e., washers, furniture
the automobiles than to other classes of mortgagees better situated
to protect themselves.
So far as immediate need is concerned, the overhauling of
our Chattel Mortgage Act should come first. The second step
could be a fairly simple retail installment selling act, applicable
to the installment selling of goods at retail within certain monetary limits.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE ACT REVISION.

In connection with the Chattel Mortgage Act revision, the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws offer the TUniform Cnmmercin]
Code. Article 9 thereof deals with the so-called secured transaction which is pertinent to this discussion. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association voted its approval of the
Code on September 20, 1951, and it is being introduced in the
current session of the New York State legislature. The Foreword
of this publication states in part that, "this Code is set up to
read upon the business transactions of today's commerce, not
that of 150 years ago."
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code would replace existing chattel mortgage and conditional sales acts as well as statutes
relating to factors liens, assignments of accounts receivable, trust
receipts, etc. It would also replace the Uniform or other Acts
dealing with negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts, sales,
bills of lading, stock transfers, bond collections, etc.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is not intended
as a complete substitute for small loan acts, retail installment
selling acts and the like. Such acts may provide for licensing
and rate regulation, as does the Colorado Small Loan Act of 1943,
and specify contract forms, as does the Colorado Retail Motor
Vehicle Installment Sales Act of 1951. However, Article 9 is intended to supersede such acts in respect to filing procedures, rights
on default, the status of after acquired property and the like.
Special consideration is given in said article to buyers of consumer goods, i. e., goods used or bought for use primarily for
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personal, family or household purposes. Coverage is also intended
for secured transactions concerning equipment goods if used or
bought for use primarily in business as well as farm products
and inventory goods.
Because of the inadequacies of Colorado law upon the occurrence of default, I will consider only Part 5 of Article 9 dealing
with defaults and, in the main, to the extent that the default
section concerns installment sales of consumer goods.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, when a debtor is ir.
default under the security agreement, the secured party may
reduce his claim to judgment. He may in addition:
1. Foreclose the security interest by any available judicial
procedure;
2. Take possession of the collateral without judicial process
if possible without breach of peace. Without removal, a secured
party may render equipment unuseable, prepare it for sale and
dispose of the collateral upon the debtor's premises if he acts
within a reasonable time.
3. Sell and recover a deficiency. He may dispose of the collateral in its then condition, or after any commercially reasonable
preparation. The proceeds of the disposition shall be applied in
the order following:
a) reasonable expenses of retaking, holding and
preparing for sale;
b) The satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by
the security interest under which the disposition is made;
c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any
subordinate security interest in the collateral if written
notification of demand therefor is received before disposition of the proceeds is completed.
The debtor is entitled to any surplus remaining and is liable
for any deficiency.
The above requirements do not differ materially from present
practice in Colorado, except that a surplus is a rarity. Due to
unrestricted financing, insurance packs and careless methods of
sale, a deficiency is more often the rule.
The Uniform Commercial Code suggests a few badly needed
safeguards in connection with sales on default. Unless collateral
is perishable, or threatens to decline speedily in value, or is of
a type customarily sold in a recognized market, the secured party
must give the debtor, and any other secured party who has an
interest and is known to the party making the disposition, reasonable notice of the time and place of any public or private sale
and appropriate notice of any other intended disposition. And
by notice is meant mail notice and not notice in some obscure
legal paper.
The secured party may buy at any public sale. If the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or
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is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard
price quotations, the secured party may also buy at a private sale.
In case of a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods, if the debtor has paid sixty percent of the cash price and
has not signed, after default, a statement renouncing his rights,
a secured party who has taken possession of collateral must dispose of it by sale in accordance with the procedures last reviewed.
However, if the secured party fails to sell within 90 days after
taking possession, the debtor may recover in conversion. He may
also proceed under another section of the Article which applies
whenever the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with
the provisions relating to default. That is to say, disposition may
be ordered or restrained by the Court upon appropriate terms
and conditions. If the disposition has occurred without notice to
the debtor, the latter is entitled to recover any resultant loss. If
the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has the right to recover, in any event, an amount not less than the credit service
charge or time price differential plus ten percent of the cash price
or principal amount of the debt.
Is REQUIRED.
Where the debtor has paid less than sixty percent of the cost
price, a secured party in possession, after default, may propose
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. He must
give written notice ol such proposal to the debtor and to any
other party known to have a security interest in the collateral.
If objection is registered by the debtor or other person having
a security interest in the collateral within thirty days of such
notification, the secured party must dispose of the collateral
through sale; but in the absence of such timely objection, he may
hold the collateral or dispose of it free from the requirements of
the Act. Of course, the secured party cannot accept the collateral
in discharge of the obligation and later recover a deficiency. Likewise, the debtor by acting timely before other rights have vested,
may reclaim the collateral by tendering payment of all sums due
as well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party
in retaking, holding and preparing for disposition.
One further provision merits mention. Installment paper
generally passes from the hands of the retail seller to a sales
finance company or bank. An agreement by a buyer of consumer
goods that he will not assert against an assignee of the paper
any claim or defense arising out of the sale is not enforcible by
any person under the suggested legislation. In other words, if
such a buyer of consumer goods, as part of one transaction, signs
both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement, even a
holder in due course of the negotiable instrument is subject to
such claims or defenses if he seeks to enforce the security interest,
either by attaching or levying upon the goods, in an action upon
the instrument. This is not so in respect to the other three classes
WRITTEN NOTICE
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of secured transactions involving equipment, farm products, or
inventory.
I confess that I view remedial legislation of this sort from
the consumer's viewpoint. Looking at enacted legislation in other
States, one can find safeguards for the consumer which do not
appear in the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code, is, of course,
a compromise between the conflicting interests represented on
the committees instrumental in its drafting and the bodies extending to it their approval. I do believe the Statutes of a number
of States, particularly Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Indiana, and Wisconsin, merit the consideration of any group which
may hereafter study the Code for contemplated adoption in Colorado.
NEEDED RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES BILL

The second step in a legislative program involves the drafting of a Retail Installment Sales Bill.
The following is offered as the essential requirements of such
a Bill:
a) Checks on Over-Extension of Credit
The greatest aid in restricting installment credit within reasonable bounds has come through Regulation W of the Federal
Reserve Board. Because federal controls on over-extension of
credit are uniform and changes can be made readily as conditions
warrant, it is to be preferred over the more rigid state control.
Any well-rounded state legislation will, however, bear down upon
over-extension of credit at several points and aid in its control.
Full disclosure of credit terms and requirement for truth in advertising are tools of this category. So also are the provisions
restricting the writing of unwarranted insurance and forbidding
onerous contract terms, all of which force the seller to be more
selective in extending credit.
One direct measure to discourage excessive credit granting
is suggested by the English Hire-Purchase Act of 1939. That
Act permits the purchaser to terminate the agreement at any time
by returning the goods so long as one-half of the purchase price
is paid. He, nevertheless, remains liable for damages in case he
has failed to take reasonable care of the goods.
b) Full Disclosure of Contract Terms
The contract evidencing the installment purchase should be
written in simple, non-technical language and should display prominently all cost elements which go to make up the total time price.
A copy of the contract should be delivered to the buyer at the time
of execution. Receipt for such delivery might well appear in bold
type immediately above the space provided for the buyer's signature. The purpose served by the requirement of full disclosure
is materially impaired if the copy is furnished at some later day.
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c) Forbidden Contract Provisions
The Maryland law emphasizes the requirement of full disclosure of the terms of the installment sales agreement by forbidding any seller, sales finance company, or holder, from taking
or receiving any instrument from the buyer which contains any
blank spaces (except serial numbers) to be filled in after such
instrument has been signed by any party thereto.
It would appear particularly important, when regulating business transactions between parties not on equal footing, to forbid
the taking of warrants or powers of attorney to appear and confess judgment in the event of the buyer's default, particularly
where agreed upon before a cause of action has accrued.
A common provision found in installment sales agreement
forms vests in the seller or holder the right to declare the entire
balance due when he deems himself insecure for any reason whatsoever. The operation of such a provision has been generally restricted by the courts to those cases where reasonable grounds for
such fear exist-mere apprehension is not enough. However, many
unadvised buyers naturally fail to question the ostensible meaning
of the provision, and because they are unable to pay the entire
balance in one payment, they voluntarily relinquish possession
of the goods. Because of the possibilities of abuse reposing in
such acceleration provisions, some laws flatly forbid its use. If
acceleration is to be permitted, it should be based upon certain
express contingencies, such as default in the contract or other
objective act rather than upon the subjective fact of seller's personal view that he is insecure.
Buyers are sometimes persuaded to participate in balloon contracts, that is, contracts with regular small periodical payments
terminated by a single large payment. The seller's motive in
framing this type of contract may be one or more of the following:
1)
To facilitate the sale of the goods through the
inducement of initially small periodical payments.
2) To enable the seller to take advantage of the
buyer's ultimate default and repossess the goods.
3) To profit by the necessary refinancing of the
contract upon due date.
Unless the balloon balance is prohibited by law, many buyers
are eventually thrown upon the mercy of the seller or contract
holder.
Forcible entry, without notice or process of law, and waiver
of damages resulting, are sometimes provided for in installment
sales agreements and are consented to unwittingly by buyers. The
seller might better be protected against dishonest buyers by
streamlining of the replevy process than by subjecting all buyers
to such summary treatment for every minor default which occurs.
The drafters of an installment selling bill should not overlook a common contract provision providing that a person acting
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on behalf of the seller or holder is treated as, or deemed to be,
an agent of the buyer. Such dual capacities should be discouraged
because of the conflicting interests involved. Nor should the seller
be permitted to relieve himself of liability for acts of persons
representing him.
Whether a seller should be allowed to take an assignment of
wages as further security is also questionable. If allowed, safeguards against abuse should be provided.
d) Insurance Regulated
Customarily, insurance is required to protect the seller from
the ordinary hazards to which the security is subject. Because
the business convenience of the seller is best served by his control
of the writing of the insurance, authority to place and control
it is usually reserved to him in the installment sales agreement.
The seller as a rule obtains the commissions arising from the
writing of the insurance. The seller is thus placed in the position
of determining, in the first instance, whether insurance is necessary, and if so, the amount, type, and term of the coverage to be
written. Judgment, in many cases, is swayed by the financial
interest involved. This is not a healthful situation. The problem
exists in most debtor-creditor relationships where security is involved and, in fact, is more serious in the real estate mortgage
field where larger sums are involved. Attack upon the problem
may best come through necessary revision or more rigid enforcement of the insurance statutes regulating insurance agents. The
possibilities of abuse, however, are numerous and should be recognized. Such controls as are possible should appear in the installment selling law. It is suggested that particular consideration
be given to the following proposals:
1) That the buyer be given the right to contract for
his own insurance if he so elects. In so doing he would
be compelled to satisfy the requirements specified by the
seller respecting the financial condition of the insuring
company but such requirements should be, at the same
time, reasonable. Discrimination against mutual companies should not be permitted. A lower scale of commissions rather than a question of security often prompts
such discrimination.
2) Where the insurance is written by or through
the contract holder, the amount, cost, type, and duration,
should be clearly stated in the installment contract. A
duplicate of the policy or a certificate of insurance should
be furnished the buyer, within a reasonable period, for
the purpose of evidencing the actual writing of the insurance in accordance with the initial agreement, as well
as to provide the buyer with more detailed information
concerning the terms of the policy issued.
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3) It should be provided by statute that any surrender or other refund, and all dividends received under
such policy, should be remitted to the buyer or credited
to his account.
e) Add-Ons Regulated.
Add-on is a method of obtaining additional security. It is
most often used in the sale of furniture and household appliances.
If the buyer, while making payments under an installment sales
contract, purchases additional goods, the seller may, through the
add-on provision of the original contract, consolidate the purchases.
If the buyer subsequently defaults, the seller, in absence of statutory restrictions, may provide for the right to repossess all the
goods sold even though sufficient money has been paid in at time
of default to cover the earlier purchases. Some laws flatly prohibit
the use of the add-on device because of the obvious abuses which
can be made of it. The treatment accorded the subject by the
Maryland law is recommended in the event add-ons are allowed.
Add-ons are permitted by the Maryland law if the original
installment sales agreement so provides. The seller must at the
time of the additional purchase, deliver to the buyer a statement
containing information with respect to the original purchase. The
statement shall show the balance before and after the add-on, the
payments agreed to be made and the number of additional months
required to complete the payments.
Future payments shall be considered as allocated among each
of the separate purchases in the same proportion which the original cash price of each bears to the total cash price of all goods
to which the seller has retained title. Actual allocation need not
be made unless seller repossesses or attempts to repossess the
goods. When the amount owing on any separate purchase has
been fully paid, the goods so paid for shall become the absolute
property of the buyer and shall not be subject to repossession
for any subsequent default on the agreement. The buyer is also
given the privilege of prepaying the amount due on any of the
separate purchases, and in case of repossession may redeem any
of the separate purchases by payment of the amount due on such
purchase alone.
f) Fair Allowance for Prepayment.
Occasionally the entire balance due under the installment
sales contract is paid or refinanced prior to the final installment
date. The finance charge is, in most sales finance transactions,
handled as a discount and based upon the assumption that the
contract will run for the full term. As thus computed, it is included in the original unpaid balance. Naturally, when this assumption is altered by payment or refinancing of the indebtedness
prior to maturity, a refund or credit of part of such charge is due
the buyer. Sellers who look to the financing rather than the sale
of merchandise for profits, overlook, and if pressed, even refuse to
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give refunds under such circumstances. Some sellers, on the other
hand, accept the opportunity to enhance customer good will and
voluntarily make partial refund of the finance charge. The buyer's
rights to some refund under such circumstances cannot in good
equity be disputed, and installment selling legislation should protect the buying public against unfair forfeitures in this connection.
Before considering what proportion of the finance charge
should be refunded to the buyer in the event of prepayment, it is
well to recognize that parties other than the buyer and the seller
are usually involved in the transaction. The great bulk of installment sales are financed through third parties. To the sales finance
company, or the industrial or commercial bank, which purchases
installment paper from the seller, the dual transaction is for all
practical purposes similar in effect to a cash loan made by the
financing agency direct to the buyer. The paper received by such
financing agencies represents principal plus finance charge. The
accounting methods followed by such agencies in segregating the
earned from the unearned finance charge should suggest means
of determining the amount of the rebate which should be made
to the buyer in case of prepayment of his account for reason that
it is the remainder, namely, the unearned portion of the finance
charge, to which the buyer makes claim. A trade practice, recognized and allowed within reasonable bounds by the administrative
authorities of Indiana and Wisconsin, is that of permitting the
retail seller to retain a portion of the finance charge to compensate
for losses incurred through sales on the installment plan. Where
this practice is indulged in, some contribution to the amount of
the refund for prepayment should be required of the retail seller.
g) Delinquent and Refinance Charges Regulated-Short-tervm
Delinquences, Grace Periods, Penalties.
Procrastination rather than inability or intentional delay undoubtedly causes the greater part of short-time delinquencies in
the installment-selling business. Being of brief duration, they do
not seriously inconvenience or constitute a financial burden to the
contract holder. Late payments are offset to some extent by the
prepaid installments of other buyers or by the same buyer at
other periods. Long-standing custom would indicate the desirability of recognizing this failing on the part of the installment
buyer by providing for a short grace period before delinquent
charges would attach. When subsequently applied, delinquent
charges should be in an amount sufficient to discourage the habit
of making late payments and to defray the extra cost incurred
by the seller because of the delinquency. However, such charges
should not be sufficiently profitable to the seller to induce him to
delay making the usual collection efforts. The buyer's attention
must be directed to the fact that late payments will subject him
to extra charges.
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h) Persisting Delinquencies.
Continuing delinquencies ultimately result in contract modification, refinancing, or repossession. It is the opinion of many
courts that when the debt is refinanced by drawing a new contract
extending the term and reducing the payments, the transaction
becomes, like a cash loan, subject to statutory interest restrictions.
Hence we find much of this type of refinancing handled through
affiliated concerns. New financing charges are made, and unless
the law is otherwise adequate, the unearned finance and insurance
charges under the original contract are sometimes "overlooked"
and forfeited. Some sellers directly refinance the deal themselves.
In the course of so doing, the flat finance charge is often repeated
without regard to past charges. The threat of repossession renders
the delinquent buyer amenable to such treatment.
The above are, in the author's opinion, the main subjects to
be considered for inclusion in Retail Installment Selling legislation.
Others may add or delete depending upon their viewpoint or extent of interest. I would not at this time advocate the regulation
of the spread between cash and time price, i. e., the financing
charge, as is done in Indiana and Pennsylvania, for several reasons. First, a simple rather than complicated legislative bill is
desirable if there is to be any practical chance for enactment in
Colorado. Second, there is a deep-seated prejudice relating to
interest restrictions in this State. Regulation of interest on finance
rates has been achieved only to a limited extent in Colorado, that
is upon small loans of $300 or less, where the interest rate is
31/,2% per month upon the first $150 of the loan and 21/2% on the
remainder, and industrial bank loans where the effective permissive rate is approximately 20',. per annum. Otherwise, parties to
credit transactions are free to agree to any rate they may see fit.
Unless a complete approach to the problem of interest rates be
undertaken, it would seem unfair to single out the financing of
installment sales for treatment. Third, an uneven and therefore
inequitable enforcement effort would result in view of the historic
reluctance of our Legislature to appropriate adequate funds to
regulatory departments. Fair contract terms, full disclosure and
filing of rate charts with the department in connection with the
licensing program is the most than can be expected.
ENACTED MOTOR VEHICLE INSTALLMENT FINANCING ACT OF

1951

I earlier mentioned the Motor Vehicle Installment Financing
Act of 1951 which became effective July 1, 1951. A quick review of
its provisions is in order as it does reflect a substantial step forward.
The Motor Vehicle Act which was H. B. 332 of the 1951 legislative session is primarily a licensing, disclosure, and refund statute. The licensing feature was amended in 1952 to release automobile dealers handling their own paper when less than fifty deals

Mar., 1952

DICTA

were handled a year. They remain subject, however, to other provisions of the Act.
Licensees are required to file their maximum rate charts with
the State Bank Commissioner.
Under the disclosure and regulation sections a completed contract must be furnished the retail buyer; confession of judgments
or power of attorney therefor are unenforceable; delinquency
charges are restricted to 5% of the amount in default or $5.00
whichever is the lesser, and cannot be imposed unless the delinquency continues for ten days. Attorney fees, based on fifteen
percent of amount due, is provided when collection is referred to
an outside attorney, and upon request, statement of account must
be rendered.
The installment sale contract must include a complete breakdown of the transaction except that where insurance is included,
the secured party is given thirty days to break down the lump
finance and insurance charge and to furnish a copy of policy. While
good arguments can be advanced for lumping finance and insurance charges, it is one weakness in the Act which in time must
be corrected.
The greatest benefit given the buyer under the Act is contained in Section 7. A buyer paying off his indebtedness in advance of its maturity is entitled to a return of a proportionate
part of the financing charge after fifteen dollars is first deducted.
This deduction represents acquisition costs. Insurance may be
cancelled upon the short rate basis.
The Act is silent in respect to re-scheduling the retail installment contract in event the payments must be deferred, the due
date extended, etc. The initial draft of the bill contained a provision
restricting fees and interest charges in such cases, but the section
was dropped in pre-introduction compromises.
The Act authorized the employment of two examiners to administer and enforce the Act, but no appropriation was made to
implement the authorization. A small loan examiner is spending
only part time on the work and only a fraction of the concerns
subject to the Act are licensed thereunder despite a sizable penalty
for failure to obtain a license. Lawyers should familiarize themselves with Section 9 (b) of the Act. It is therein provided that
if any person shall willfully violate the disclosure and refund
upon prepayment sections, he shall forfeit the interest or finance
charge as well as delinquency or collection charges.
BOOK TRADERS CORNER
A Denver law firm offers for sale a complete set of the Pacific
Reporter and Pacific Second, including the Advance Sheets and
Shephard's Pacific Gitator. All volumes are in perfect condition.
Contact the Bar Association office, ALpine 1355, 1726 Champa
Street, Denver.
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FORMS COMMITTEE PRESENTS STANDARD
PLEADING SAMPLES TO BE USED IN
DIVORCE LITIGATION
The Forms Committee submits herewith standard pleading
samples for use in divorce litigation. Separate maintenance actions would use almost the same forms. It is realized that all of
the possible types of motions and orders cannot feasibly be presented in any one article; so only those causing the most trouble
-and, therefore, the most controversial-are offered. Suggestions
for improvement of these forms are urgently requested, and if
there are other forms desired, the Committee shall attempt to
draft them and publish the same at a later date.
FORMS STANDARDIZATION COMMITTEE,

ROYAL

C. RUBRIGHT, Chairman,

SUB-COMMITTEE ON DISTRICT COURT FORMS,
DONALD M. LESHER, Chairman.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER AND
STATE OF COLORADO
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2-711, DIV. 9.
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
COMPLAINT IN
DIVORCE
REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.f
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Raton, New
Mexico, the first day of April, 1948; plaintiff has been a bona fide
resident and citizen of Colorado during the year next prior to
the commencement of this action, and plaintiff and defendant
presently reside in the City and County of Denver.'
2. The parties have two children:
Name
Date of Birth
Mathilda Sophronia Hpuiwmn
August 15, 1948
Alfonso Grthvlm Hpuiwmn
December 25, 1951
Plaintiff desires their custody.
3. Defendant has been extremely and repeatedly cruel toward
plaintiff, such cruelty consisting of the infliction of mental suffer2
ing and bodily violence committed in the State of Colorado.
Wa14 F A/

'Inapplicable if not a resident that long onleg sought on ground of
adultry or extreme cruelty committed in Colorado. If action is brought in
county where defendant last resided, so state. (See Sec. 6, Ch. 56.)
' If other grounds, insert (see Chapter 56, Secs. 1 and 2).
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4. Defendant has income sufficient to support plaintiff and
the minor children, and to pay the costs and 3expenses of this
action, and to pay the obligations of the parties.
5. The parties own real property described as Lots 1 and 2,
Block 1, Dousthul Heights, City and County of Denver, Colorado,
and certain
personal property, which should be divided between
4
them.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for a divorce, custody of the
minor children, alimony, support for the children, a division of
property, attorney fees and costs, and for such other and further
relief as to the Court may seem proper.5
Plaintiff's Address:
Silvester Hasede6
11 Waan Avenue,
Attorney for Plaintiff
Denver 6, Colorado.
1st Majestic-Equitable Bldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado,DYbryt 004U.
The Summons is omitted, because it is a routine form (see
Form 1, App. A, Vol. 1, C.S.A.). If complaint is served with it,
the Denver District Court form of summons may be completed
by adding at the end where it states "This is an action," the words
"in divorce." If complaint is served later, the grounds should
be typed in also, although the Committee takes no position as to
the necessity of this.
If the summons is accepted voluntarily, a suggested form
for acceptance of service is the following affidavit, to be typed
on the reverse side of the summons.
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERJSS"
I, Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, being duly sworn, state that
I am of full age, am the defendant in this action, have received
a copy of the summons and complaint and accept service thereof,
and state that I am not now in the Military Service.
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of February, 1952.
Sally N. Doakes
Notary Public.
My commission expires September 20, 1953.
3Omit

if no support or alimony is requested.
Omit if property settlement is not involved.
0 Complaint virtually the same for separate maintenance, except grounds
are broader (Sec. 25), and relief sought would be separate maintenance and
maintenance instead of divorce and alimony.
4The Grthvlm family, of which Celestine is the oldest daughter, has been
a constant source of income to old Hasede.
4
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(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORII NA
HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
REGINALD PHINE'HAS
HPUIWMN,

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
ALIMONY, SUPPORT FOR
MINOR CHILDREN,
ATTORNEY FEES AND
7
COURT COSTS.

fpn don 1_

Plaintiff moves that the Court enter an order granting her
temporary alimony, support for the minor children of the parties,
attorney fees, and court costs, defendant having sufficient income
and property to pay therefor and plaintiff having insufficient
funds for said purposes.
Address of Plaintiff:
11 Waan Avenue,
Denver 6, Colorado.
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff
1st Majestic-Equitable Bldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado, Dybryt 004U.
(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,9
Defendant.

MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
8
ORDER.

Plaintiff moves that the Court issue a temporary restraining
order without notice to the defendant on the matters and for the
reasons stated herein.
1. The defendant has committed physical violence against
plaintiff on several occasions.
2. As a result of the bodily violence and abusive treatment
by defendant, plaintiff is in fear both for herself and for their
minor children of further physical violence by defendant.
This could have been filed at any time after the complaint, but in

this

instance it was filed at the same time. Notice for hearing is omitted, but it was
served at this time also.
8 Mrs. Hpuiwmn wanted her husband out of the house, and was afraid he
would hide his stocks and bonds. She didn't want him to molest her (even
though she wanted to be free to pick on him at will). So motion for temporary restraining order was filed with her complaint and order obtained the
same day. It could have been done later.
9 If a Bank or other person is to be restrained, join them as parties in the
original complaint; set forth details covering them in Motion.
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3. Plaintiff believes that unless restrained by this Court
defendant will destroy, harm, or otherwise dispose of her possessions in the family home at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado,
and fears that defendant will remove therefrom not only her
possessions but also the family furniture and furnishings now
present therein.
4. Defendant has in his possession or under his control certain securities, safety deposit boxes, bank accounts, and other
personal property, and also has an interest in a business known
as Hpuiwmn and Uktlus, and plaintiff fears that unless restrained
by this Court defendant will dispose of or place beyond the reach
of this Court said property. 10
5. Defendant could find a place to live elsewhere, but plaintiff believes he will refuse to leave the home of the parties unless
ordered by this Court so to do.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves that, until the further order
of this Court:
1. Defendant be restrained from talking to, communicating
with, or otherwise molesting plaintiff, or from interfering, in any
way, with plaintiff's custody of the minor children, Mathilda
Sophronie Hpuiwmn and Alfonso Grthvlm Hpuiwmn.
2. Defendant be restrained from disposing of or removing
any of his property or effects except money for current expenses,
and from entering any safety deposit box in any bank, safe deposit company, or depository.
3. Defendant be restrained from destroying, removing, or
injuring any property belonging to the plaintiff, and from destroying, removing, or injuring any household goods, furnishings,
or furniture in the residence of the parties at 11 Waan Avenue,
Denver, Colorado.
4. Defendant be required to remove himself from the family
residence at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado, by 6 p.m. on the
day next following the day he is served with restraining order,
and that he be restrained thereafter from entering, loitering, or
remaining near said premises.
Silvester Hasede,
Attorney for Plaintiff,
1st Majestic-EquitableBldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado, DYbryt 004U.
Plaintiff's Address:
11 Waan Avenue,
Denver, Colorado.
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERjSS"
1"It is suggested that real estate not be included here; lis pendens can be
recorded and protect any right plaintiff may have therein.
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The undersigned, being duly sworn, says that the facts set
forth in the above motion are true.
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of February,
1952.
Ima DeMopublican
Clerk of the District Court.
By Q. D. Istrictcap
Deputy Clerk.
ORDER."
The above motion is granted, and the Clerk is hereby ordered
to issue a Temporary Restraining Order to the defendant in the
manner and form as shown on the Temporary Restraining Order
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
Done in Open Court this 15th day of February,1952.
BY THE COURT,
Zadok Zedekiah 12
Judge.
CELESTINE CORINNA
HPUIWMN,
i
VS.

P i TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING
ORDER.

REGINALD PHINEHAS
HPUIWMN,
Defendant.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO:
To Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, Defendant:
GREETING:
It satisfactorily appearing to the Court, from plaintiff's motion on file herein, that sufficient grounds exist therefor:
IT IS ORDERED that until the further order of said Court,
you and each of your servants, agents, attorneys, employees, and
all persons acting under the control, authority, or direction of
you, do absolutely refrain from and desist from:
1. Talking to, communicating with, or otherwise molesting
plaintiff, or interfering, in any way, with plaintiff's custody of the
minor children, Mathilda Sophronia Hpuiwmn and Alfonso Grthvlm
Hpuiwmn.
11This order could be attached directly to the motion for temporary restraining order.
"It will be noted that his honor, Judge Zedekiah, formerly sat in Division
7, but was transferred to Division 9 when the General Assembly increased the
number of Denver District Judges,
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2. Disposing of or removing any of your property or effects
except money for current expenses, and entering any safety
de13
posit box in any bank, safe deposit company, or depository.
3. Destroying, removing, or injuring any property belonging
to the plaintiff, and destroying, removing, or injuring any household goods, furnishings, or furniture in the residence of the parties
at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you will remove yourself
from the family residence at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado,
by 6 p.m. on the day following the day you are served with this
restraining order, and you are restrained thereafter from entering, loitering or remaining near said premises.
WITNESS the Honorable Zadok Zedekiah, one of the Judges
of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State
of Colorado, with the seal thereof affixed, at my office, in the City
and County of Denver, this 15th day of February, 1952.
Ima DeMopublican
Clerk.
(SEAL)
By Q. D. Istrictcap
Deputy.
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERJSS"
I do hereby certify that I delivered to the said defendant a
copy of the within restraining order this 16th day of February,
1952.
Juan F. Mersbuys,
(SEAL)
Manager of Safety and Excise and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City
and County of Denver
By I. Will Ketchum
Deputy Sheriff.
(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.

1
MOTION FOR
CITATION FOR
CONTEMPT: 4 OF
COURT.

13If other person is to be restrained, bond must be posted as to such person.
This is not necessary, however, as to parties to the divorce. An additional order
should be entered for each such other person. In the event that any bank or
other depository is to be affected by orders of the divorce Court, such persons
should be named as original parties and brought within the jurisdiction of the
Court.
11Had the bank been joined as a party and restrained from permitting
Reginald access to the safety box, it probably would not have been necessary
to cite Reginald for contempt.
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The plaintiff represents:
That on February 15, 1952, a temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court, restraining defendant, among other
things, from talking to, communicating with, or otherwise molesting plaintiff and from disposing of or removing any of his property
or effects and from entering any safety deposit box in any bank.
That defendant was personally served with said temporary
restraining order on February 16, 1952.
That defendant has disobeyed said order in the following
particulars:
1. On February 18, 1952, defendant talked to plaintiff
on the telephone at her residence, 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado, from 9:15 to 9:26 P.M.
2. On February 19, 1952, defendant entered his safety deposit box at the Second National Bank, Denver, Colorado, and
removed therefrom certain securities.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves that the Court issue an order
to the Clerk to cite and give notice to the said defendant to be
and appear before the Court at a date and time to be stated in
said order, to show cause, if any he has, why he should not be
punished for contempt, for neglect and refusal to comply with the
order of the Court heretofore entered herein, in the particulars
referred to in plaintiff's above motion, and why, to vindicate the
dignity of the Court, a fine or imprisonment should not be imposed upon him.
Plaintiff's Address:
11 Waan Avenue,
Denver 6, Colorado.
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff
1st Majestic-Equitable Bldg.
Denver 2, Colorado, DYbryt 004U.
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERISS"
The undersigned being duly sworn, says that the facts set
forth in the above motion are true.
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February,
1952.
Sally N. Doakes
Notary Public.
My commission expires September 20, 1953.
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(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.

ORDER FOR
CITATION.

It is hereby ordered that the Clerk issue forthwith a citation
to the defendant, Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, to be and appear
before this Court on the 25th day of February, 1952, at the hour
of 9:30 o'clock A.M., to show cause, if any he may have, why he
should not be punished for contempt for neglect and refusal to
comply with the order of the Court heretofore entered herein, in
the particulars referred to in plaintiff's motion for citation for
contempt of Court incorporated herein by reference, and why, to
vindicate the dignity of the Court, a fine or imprisonment should
not be imposed upon him.
DONE IN OPEN COURT, this 20th day of February, 1952.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge.
(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,

CITATION.

VS.

REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, TO THE
SHERIFF OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
Greeting:
WHEREAS, In a certain cause in said Court now pending,
wherein Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn is plaintiff, and Reginald
Phinehas Hpuiwmn is defendant, a certain order was entered of
record, whereby defendant was restrained from talking to, communicating with, or otherwise molesting plaintiff, and from disposing of, or removing any of his property or effects and from entering any safety deposit box in any bank.
AND, WHEREAS, It appears to the Court that the defendant,
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, has failed to comply with said order
in the particulars referred to in plaintiff's motion, incorporated
herein by reference and attached hereto.
THESE ARE THEREFORE TO COMMAND YOU, That you
cite and give notice to the said defendant, Reginald Phinehas
Hpuiwmn, to be and appear before the Hon. Zadok Zedekiah in
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the 9th Division of this Court on the 25th day of February, 1952,
at the hour of 9:30 o'clock A.M., to show cause, if any he have,
why he should not be punished for contempt, for neglect and refusal to comply with the order of the Court heretofore entered
herein, and why, to vindicate the dignity of the Court, a fine and
imprisonment should not be imposed upon him.
WITNESS, Ima DeMopublican, Clerk of said Court, this 20th
day of February, 1952.
Ima DeMopublican
(SEAL)
Clerk.
By Q. D. Istricap
Deputy Clerk.
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERss.
STATE OF COLORADO
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, That I have duly executed the
within writ this 21st day of February, 1952, by handing to and
leaving with Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn a copy of this citation,
together with a copy of motion for citation for contempt of court
and order for citation, at Denver, Colorado.
Juan F. Mersbuys,
(SEAL)
Manager of Safety and Excise and
Ex-Officic Sheriff of the City
and County of Denver.
By I. Will Ketchum
Deputy Sheriff.
The Court's order at the contempt hearing is omitted to avoid
the necessity of entering into personalities.
(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA
HPUIWMN,

Plaintiff,

vs.
REGINALD PHINEHAS
HPUIWMN,

ANSWER AND
15
COUNTERCLAIM.

Defendant.
FIRST DEFENSE.
1. Defendant admits the averments of paragraphs 1, 2, and
5, except as set forth below.
2. Defendant denies the averments of paragraphs 3 and 4,
1 Sec. 7 uses the word "Cross-complaint," but it is believed that Sec. 5 (1)
as amended in 1945 making the Rules applicable to Divorce, etc. controls, and
that the preferred word now is "counterclaim" (Rule 13).
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averring that the property should be divided
is without knowledge or information sufficient
to the averment in paragraph 2 that plaintiff
of the children therein named.

SECOND DEFENSE.
1. Plaintiff has been guilty of acts set forth in 1935 C.S.A.,
Chapter 56, Section 1, Third and Seventh, which acts constitute
grounds for defendant to divorce plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff has, by her subsequent conduct, condoned any of
defendant's acts constituting cruelty, which acts defendant denies.
COUNTERCLAIM. 16
1. Same as paragraph 1 of complaint.
2. Same as paragraph 2 of complaint, except that defendant
desires the custody of the children therein named.
3. Plaintiff has been guilty
17 of acts set forth in C.S.A., Chap.
56, Sec. 1, Third and Seventh.
4. Same as paragraph 5 of complaint.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiff's complaint
be dismissed at plaintiff's costs, for a divorce, custody of the
minor children, a division of property, and for such other and
further relief as to the Court may seem proper.
Defendant's Address:
Graswid Wehr's
Rest Home,
Denver, Colorado.
Actspard, Dimorzgo, Hort, Hrmok,
Lgndah and Pbddson
By F. Lunkeynum Berten
Attorneys for Defendant,
Court House Square Bldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado, ZEckendorf 0008.
Hpuiwmn calmed down, and, rather than face a contest and
possible denial of divorce to both parties (Chap. 56, Sec. 7), he
allowed Celestine to proceed to a non-contested decree. The form
of decree to be used in event of a jury or court trial of a contested
divorce is omitted, because that decree could be similar to any
civil trial verdict and judgment, with findings for or against
each party.
26Request for jury trial is omitted, but would be identical to that of other
civil actions.
17Vagueness is sometimes preferred to stating adultry, drunkenness or drug
addiction. Statutory words could be used instead of merely the reference to the
Statute.
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(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

INTERLOCUTORY
DECREE IN
DIVORCE."'

REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.
THIS CAUSE, coming on to be heard on this 20th day of
March, 1952, upon its merits, the plaintiff being represented by
Silvester Hasede, attorney of record, and the defendant appearing
by F. Lunkeynum Berten, attorney of record, and the Court having
examined the full record herein, finds that it has jurisdiction
herein; and having heard the evidence and the statements of counsel, the Court now being fully advised;
DOTH FIND that a divorce should be granted to the plaintiff herein upon the statutory grounds of extreme and repeated
acts of cruelty; therefore,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court,
that an absolute divorce should be granted to the plaintiff, and an
Interlocutory Decree of Divorce is hereby entered, dissolving the
marriage of plaintiff and defendant six months after the date of
this Interlocutory Decree.
IT IS EXPRESSLY DECREED by the Court that during
such six months period after the signing of this Interlocutory
Decree the parties hereto shall not be divorced; shall still be husband and wife, and neither party shall be competent to contract
another marriage anywhere during such period, and the Court
during all of said period does hereby retain jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject matter of this cause and upon motion of
either party, or upon its motion, for good cause shown, after a
hearing, may set aside this Interlocutory Decree.
It is Further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by
the COURT that defendant shall pay into the Registry of the
District Court on the 1st and 15th day of each month, commencing April 1, 1952, and continuing until further order of this Court,
"The decree herewith submitted is identical to the printed form used by
the Denver District Court. It is believed by the committee, however, that the
following form would be sufficient in most instances:
"THIS MATTER, coming on to be heard:
THE COURT DOTH FIND:
That a divorce should be granted to the plaintiff upon the grounds of extreme and repeated acts of cruelty; therefore, IT IS ORDERED:
That an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce is hereby entered in favor of the
plaintiff, dissolving the marriage of plaintiff and defendant six months after
the date of this Interlocutory Decree.
The Court FURTHER DECREES that after six months from the date
hereof this Interlocutory Decree shall be and become a Final Decree of Divorce
and the parties shall then be divorced, unless this Interlocutory Decree shall
have been set aside, or an appeal has been taken, or a writ of error has been
issued.
Done in open Court this 20th day of March, 1952."
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the sum of $100.00, payable $50.00 to plaintiff for temporary alimony and $25.00 to plaintiff for the support of each child, and
also, on or before March 25, 1952, defendant shall pay into the
Registry of the District Court the sum of $163.00, payable $13.00
to plaintiff for her Court costs to date and $150.00 to plaintiff
on account of plaintiff's attorney fees, which $150.00 plaintiff
has assigned to her attorney Silvester Hasede, and which the Clerk
is to pay directly to said attorney.1
It is Further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by
the Court that the sole care, custody and control of the minor
children, Mathilda Sophronia Hpuiwrmn and Alfonso Grtholm
Hpuiwmn, is hereby awarded to the plaintiff as a suitable person
to have such care and custody until the further order of the
2
Court, with the defendant to have reasonable visitation rights. "
The Court FURTHER DECREES that after six months from
the date hereof this Interlocutory Decree shall be and become a
Final Decree of Divorce and the parties shall then be divorced,
unless this Interlocutory Decree shall have been set aside, or an
appeal has been taken, or a writ of error has been issued.
Done in open Court this 20th day of March, 1952.
BY THE COURT,
Zadok Zedekiah,
Judge.
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
F. Lunkeynum Berten,
Attorney for Defendant.

I" In this case, the parties had not arrived at a settlement. Calling it "temporary alimony" looks like no settlement. If there were an agreement and the
parties wanted part or all of it enforceable by the Court in this same action,
the entire agreement or pertinent portions could be extracted or paraphrased
and included as part of the Court order at this stage in the decree, being sure
that the order included as a preface a remark such as: "The Court finds that
the parties have arrived at an agreement as to alimony, support, division of
property, and other matters, which agreement has been admitted into evidence
as exhibit "A" and which is approved by the Court, and the parties are hereby
ordered to carry out the following provisions thereof: Then set out the entire agreement or the portions desired in the order, but don't do it just by
reference. Spell it out in the body of the decree.
Sometimes, even where there is an agreement, the parties do not want
it put in the decree for income tax reasons, desire to avoid later modification
or enlargement, keeping it off record, etc.
2"It is hoped the Hpuiwmns are able to work this out. If not, the Court
later will have to spell out in detail when the father can see the children,
whether or not he can take 'them out of the house, who will feed them, and
so on, ad infinitum.
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(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINAL DECREE
IN DIVORCE 21

REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.
On this day, it appearing to the Court that an Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce was entered herein on the 20th day of March,
1952, which decreed that six (6) months after the entry of the
said Interlocutory Decree, it shall be and become a Final Decree
of Divorce, unless such Interlocutory Decree has been duly set
aside, or an appeal has been taken, or a writ of error has been
issued.
And it further appearing to the Court that no appeal has
been taken and no writ of error has been issued by the Supreme
Court, and that the said Interlocutory Decree has not been set
aside:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court,
that more than six (6) months' time has elapsed since the entry
of said Interlocutory Decree, and that said Interlocutory Decree
has become and now is a Final Decree of Divorce, made and entered upon the terms and conditions contained in the Interlocutory Decree, or any2 modification or change thereof subsequently
made by the Court . 2
Done in open Court this 21st day of September, 1952.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
(SEAL)
Judge.

When the decree became final, Mrs. Hpuiwmn moved for
permanent alimony, support, division of property, and, at their
insistence, for attorney fees. We omit the form of the motion,
but include the order entered:
' Some courts require a motion for final decree which could be substantially as follows: "Plaintiff moves for entry of final decree in accordance with
the terms of the interlocutory decree entered herein on March 20, 1952." Other
courts enter the final decree as a matter of course. It will be noted that in
Hpuiwmn v. Hpuiwmn, no action was taken by the parties during the six
months' period to alter the provisions of the interlocutory decree.
2 The Hpuiwmns had not agreed on final settlement. Had they done so,
part or all of their agreement could have been made a part of the final decree,
in the same way as discussed in Note No. 19.

Mar., 1952

DICTA

(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA
HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
REGINALD PHINEHAS
HPUIWMN,
Defendant.

ORDER FOR ALIMONY,
SUPPORT, DIVISION OF
OTHER
PROPERTY AND 23
MATTERS

THIS MATTER having come on to be heard this 29th day
of September, 1952:
THE COURT DOTH FIND:
1. That Final Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter
September 21, 1952.
2. That at this date both parties are in good bodily health.
3. That plaintiff is not and never has been employed and
has no income and defendant during the past year has drawn
an average of $425.00 a month from the partnership business of
Hpuiwmn and Uktlus.
4. That the parties at this time own the following property:
The residence in which plaintiff and the two children
live at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado, legally described as Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Dousthul Heights, City
and County of Denver, of a current market value of
$10,000.00, encumbered by a deed of trust securing a note
in the present balance of $2,500.00, payable to the Only
State Bank of Montclair, on which payments in the
amount of $40.00 a month (including interest, taxes and
insurance) are due on the first of each month. This property was purchased December 1, 1951, and the purchase
money was contributed one-half by plaintiff's and onehalf by defendant's family as a Christmas gift to the
two of them. Title is held in joint tenancy.
500 Shares of Denargo Oil Co. of Toronto, common
stock of a value of $500.00, purchased in August of 1951
with funds from the former joint bank account of the
parties.
A joint Savings Account in the 2nd National Bank
of Denver, balance of $242.00 representing gifts from
the family of each.
Defendant's checking account in the same bank, balance of $319.00.
Plaintiff's checking account in the same bank, balance of $28.00.
It is recognized that because this order is based almost completely on the
peculiarity of the particular facts, it will vary greatly in each case.
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A 1946 Chevrolet Club Coupe, property of defendant before marriage, with title now in plaintiff's name,
needed by defendant in his business and by the plaintiff to assist in caring for the children, of a current
market value of $700.00.
An interest in the above partnership business, at a
book value of $9,726.41, built up from a $50.00 investment from a joint checking account in February of 1949.
Both plaintiff and defendant are listed as partners, in
the same amount, but defendant devotes full time to it
and plaintiff has never been active. The other partners
will approve an assignment of plaintiff's interest to defendant, but will dissolve the partnership if plaintiff is
to remain a partner.
6--$100.00 maturity value Co-ownership U. S. Savings Bonds of a redemption value of $450.00, purchased
from funds from a joint checking account in November,
1951.
$10,000.00 straight life policy with the NMYRON
Insurance Company and $10,000.00 straight life policy
with National Service Life Insurance Company, on defendant's life, on which yearly premiums of $225.00 and
$114.00 respectively are payable in June of each year,
and on which plaintiff is primary and the children named
in the complaint herein are secondary beneficiaries.
6. That at this time there are, in addition to the note and
deed of trust in the house, unpaid bills for personal family expenses of the parties incurred before this action was instituted
in a total amount of $56.00, as shown by Plaintiff's Exhibits
"D1,"p "E,"p "F," and "G."
7. That plaintiff's attorney has performed serv:ce3 for plaintiff of a reasonable value of $250.00, of which amount $150.00
has been paid pursuant to previous order, leaving an unpaid balance of $100.00; it has been stipulated that the amount found
due, if any, from defendant to plaintiff for plaintiff's attorney
fees shall be paid directly to said attorney and not to plaintiff.
8. That $200.00 per month is a reasonable sum for the support of plaintiff and of the children named in the complaint,
inclusive of payments on the note to the Only State Bank of
Montclair.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. That defendant shall pay into the Registry of the District Court, on the 1st and 15th of each month, commencing October 1, 1952, and continuing until further order of this Court,
the sum of $100.00, payable $50.00 to plaintiff for alimony and
$25.00 to plaintiff for the support of each child.
2. That defendant shall pay unto said Registry, on or before
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October 10, 1952, the sum of $100.00, payable to Silvester Hasede,
in full the balance of plaintiff's attorney fees.
3. That defendant shall, on or before October 10, 1952, pay
the $56.00 in outstanding bills above referred to and file receipts
therefor with the Clerk of the District Court.
4. That the real property herein
2 4 involved shall be disposed
of by separate order entered herein.
5. That Defendant is the owner of both plaintiff's and defendant's interest in the partnership business, Hpuiwmn and
Uktlus, and plaintiff will execute the necessary instruments to
assign to defendant whatever interest she may hold. Defendant
shall reimburse plaintiff for any income tax liability there may
be in plaintiff in connection with her previous position as a partner in said business.
6. That the remaining property of the parties shall be divided
as follows:
(a) Each party is the owner of his or her individual
checking account.
(b) The Chevrolet automobile is the property of the
defendant.
(c) Plaintiff is the owner of the Denargo Oil Company of Toronto common stock and of the joint savings
account in the 2nd National Bank of Denver.
(d) Each party is the owner of three (3) of the
$100.00 U. S. Savings Bonds.
7. That Defendant shall maintain in full force and effect
and free of any liens and encumbrances the life insurance policy
with the NMYRON Insurance Company, paying the premiums
as they fall due, with plaintiff as the primary beneficiary on
$5,000.00, and each child on $2,500.00 thereof, with the children
as secondary beneficiaries on all of said insurance. In event of
plaintiff's death or remarriage before defendant's death, defendant
may substitute the children as primary beneficiaries on plaintiff's $5,000.00. As each child attains the age of 21, defendant
may delete said child as a beneficiary. Present mode of settlement will be altered to provide for lump sum settlement on the
death of the insured. The policy will be deposited with the Clerk
of the District Court, and the premium receipts will be similarly
deposited as received.
The other policy is the property of defendant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motion for new trial is
dispensed with, and 60 days is allowed to either party for Reporter's Transcript.
Done in Open Court this 29th day of September, 1952.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah,
Judge.
14

Separate order is used to dispose of the real property to prevent the

necessity of recording a long instrument, only a small portion of which

pertinent.

is
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Approved as to Form:
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff,
1st Majestic-EquitableBldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado-DYbryt 004U.
Actspard, Dimorzzo, Hort, Hrmok, Lgndah and Pbddson,
By F. Lunkeynum Berten,
Attorneys for Defendant,
Court House Square Building,
Denver 2, Colorado-ZEckendorf 0008.

1

(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

{

ORDER FOR
DISTRIBUTION OF
REAL PROPERTY

REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come on to be heard this 29th day
of September, 1952:
THE COURT DOTH ORDER:
That Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn is the owner of Lots 1 and
2, Block 1, Dousthul Heights, in the City and County of Denver,
State of Colorado, subject to encumbrances of record, and that
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn has no right, title, or interest in or
to the said property. 25
That Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn make all payments on the
existing promissory note to the Only State Bank of Montclair,
secured by Deed of Trust encumbering said real property, 26 and
that said Deed of Trust shall be released before said Celestine
Corinna Hpuiwmn convey her interest in said real property.
Done in open Court this 29th day of September, 1952.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah,
Judge.
2 Although it is customary for a divorce decree to direct one of the parties
to convey to the other, or, if he fails to so convey, to appoint a commissioner
to act in his stead, it will be noted that the form herewith submitted omits
such conveyance. Authority for such procedure may be found in Sec. 279,
Patton on Titles, where, among other things, it is said: "The effect of such a
decree is in all respects equivalent to a deed executed by the party whom the
decree divests of title and in favor of the party thereby invested, except that the
latter takes title subject to the contingency of is revesting in case of a reversal
of the decree."
Sec. 8, Ch. 56, 1935 C.S.A., provides: . . . when a divorce has been granted
the court ...
may decree a division of property . .
See: 84 Colo. 429, 73 Colo. 337, 74 Colo. 231.
See also: 176 P. (2) 363, 148 P. (2) 369, 76 ALR 296, 64 ALR 1392, 124
U. S. 74 (31 L. Ed. 344), 108 N. E. 796, 144 N. W. 139.
"Because his interest in the real estate is extinguished, the defendant is
protected, as a matter of law, from the plaintiff's non-payment, by his right
to bid at any foreclosure sale.
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RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLAN FOR LAWYERS
Upon the recommendation of the Committee on Taxation, the
Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association unanimously
adopted a resolution favoring the enactment of pending bills in
Congress providing for a retirement benefit plan for professional
and other persons having earned income and who are not employed by a corporation. The members of the Denver Bar Association have adopted a similar resolution.
There is a great need for tax legislation permitting a professional man to provide a retirement fund for himself similar
to those now available to employees and executives of corporations
under various pension plans. Support in the last two years has
gained momentum for the enactment of such legislation. The
Keogh and Reed Bills H.R. 4371 and H.R. 4374, respectively, were
introduced in Congress last year. These two bills are presently
being considered by the Ways and Means Committee.
These two bills have been approved in substance by many
professional associations including, in adition to the American
Bar Association, the American Medical Association, the American
Institute of Accountants, the American Dental Association, the
Authors League of America, Inc. and many others.
It is stated in the report of the Special Committee on Retirement Benefits of the American Bar Association:
"The Internal Revenue Code by Section 165 now
encourages stockholders to provide retirement benefits for
the officers and employees of corporations by permitting
tax deductions for the contributions made by the corporations and by permitting income of qualified pension plans
to be tax exempt. No such tax benefits in any form are
granted by the law to professional men or the other recipients or earned income.
It is becoming increasingly difficult for professional
men and other members of this group to save enough to
provide adequate retirement benefits and protection on
death. This difficulty unquestionably will be increased as
income tax rates increase.
Your Committee believes that, from the standpoint
of society, it is of the utmost importance to encourage
young men to enter into the professions and into selfemployed work. Yet the policy of society, as shown by the
acts of Congress, instead of granting encouragement to
this group, tends to do exactly the reverse and to make
more attractive the employment by large corporations.
This, we believe to be against public interest."
The gist of these bills is to permit a taxpayer who is a member of a bona fi?e agriculture, labor, business, industrial or professional association to pay into a trust fund forming a part of
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a retirement plan, an amount in any one year not to exceed 10%
of his earned net income (but in no event more than $7,500.00
per year) which would be deductible for income tax purposes. The
trustee must be a bank which is a member of the Federal Reserve
System. The trustee would invest the funds in securities legal
for trust fund investment. The earnings and income of the trust
fund would be exempt from Federal Income Tax. On retirement
or death of the beneficiary, the amount invested by a taxpayer
together with the earnings would be paid out according to several
alternative plans. The interest of a taxpayer in the fund may not be
distributed to him before age 60 except in case of total or permanent disability. Upon reaching age 60 the taxpayer may elect
distribution in either:
1. A lump sum;
2. Annual installments over a period of years, or
3. The purchase by the trustee in the name of the
member of one or more singular premium, noncommutable life annuity contracts.
Upon distribution, the fund would be subject to Federal Income Tax. If the taxpayer elects to take his interest in a lump sum,
the entire sum would be taxed as a long term capital gain. Any
other method of distribution would be fully taxable as ordinary
income.
This legislation is vitally necessary for professional men who
cannot be covered by pension plans. Congressmen should be contacted by everyone so that this legislation may be reported out of
the Ways and Means Committee with or without a hearing. The
Committee on Taxation earnestly requests that each reader of
"Dicta" write his Congressmen today.
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
KENNETH L. SMITH, Chairman
FRANK DOLAN
FLOYD

K.

HASKELL

Louis HELLERSTEIN
HOVER T. LENTZ
ROBERT G. SMITH
FRED T. TANQUARY

ATTENTION
Dicta is now in its 29th year of publication. An increasing
number of law libraries throughout the country are subscribing
to this publication and demand for back issues is now very heavy.
The editor therefore urges all subscribers to safeguard their older
issues of Dicta or notify the Bar Association before discarding
any quantities of back numbers.
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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IS THE VIOLENCE USED IN
OBTAINING CONFESSIONS AND EVIDENCE THE TRUE
TEST OF DUE PROCESS?-Many students of constitutional law
believe that the Second through the Eighth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution should apply to the states. Included in this
group were four justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Adamson v. People of California.' Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion in that case, said that to
apply these would require more than one-half the states which
now have a substitute for indictment by grand jury to use the
grand jury, and would require all states to furnish a jury of twelve
for every case involving a claim of over twenty dollars. An enormous and unjustified burden would thereby be placed upon the
states.
It has been held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include: indictments by grand jury 2; trial
by jury in civil and criminal cases 3; the right against self-incrimination 4; protection against double jeopardy 7; the right of suppression of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure.G
The court used the due process clause to prevent convictions
based upon evidence of confessions obtained by force, coercion,
or brutality. In Brown v. Mississippi,7 the court said, "the rack
and torturechamber may not be substituted for the witness stand."
It consequently appeared that the court was punishing flagrant
abuses of self-incrimination by simply calling upon the due process
clause. Lawyers then seemed to believe that the test was one of
real versus oral evidence. They believed that a state could permit
the use of any evidence forcibly taken from the accused or from
his premises, but that coerced confessions were prohibited.
Some of the misapprehensions were alleviated by the case of
Rochin v. People of California8 decided January 2, 1952. The
'332

U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).

Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).
'Walker v. Sauvienet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. Ed. 628 (1875). Maxwell v. Dow,
2

176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597 (1900).
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97, Adamson v.

People of California. Loc. Cit.
Polko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
'Wolf v. People of Colorado, 338 U. S. 25. 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782
(1949).

1 Brown et al. v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461,
(1932); Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 1347,
(1947); Turner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62,
93 L. Ed. 1810 (1949) ; Harris v. State of South Carolina, 338 U.
1354, 93 L. Ed. 1815 (1949).
672 S. Ct. (1952).

80 L. Ed. 682
93 L. Ed. 1801
69 S. Ct. 1352,
S. 68, 69 S. Ct.
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Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter in whose opinion
five other justices concurred, set aside a conviction based in a large
part upon evidence forcibly taken from the accused on the grounds
that "it would be improper to legalize force so brutal and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect as is
revealed by this record." The record read, in part, as follows:
Having some information that (Rochin) was selling
narcotics, three deputy sheriffs of the County of Los Angeles . . . made for a two-story building house in which
Rochin lived . . . Finding the outside door open, they entered and then forced open the door to Rochin's room on
the second floor. Inside they found the petitioner sitting
partly dressed on the side of the bed, upon which his wife
was lying. On a "night stand" beside the bed the deputies
spied two capsules. When asked "Whose stuff is this?"
Rochin seized the capsules and put them in his mouth.
A struggle ensued, in the course of which the three officers "jumped upon him," and attempted to extract the
capsules. The force they applied proved unavailing
against Rochin's resistance. He was handcuffed and taken
to a hospital. At the direction of the officers a doctor
forced invito an emetic solution into Rochin's stomach by
means of a tube. This "stomach pumping" produced
vomiting. in the vomited matter were found two capsules
which proved to contain morphine.
At the trial for "possessing a preparation of morphine" the
chief evidence to convict the defendant was the tablets. The facts
relating to the illegal taking were brought to the attention of the
California courts on appeal,9 and the issue of constitutionality was
raised in the trial courts and appellate courts.
The conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the constitutional ground that there had been
a denial of "due process of law."
The court let it be known that exclusions of illegally obtained
evidence necessitated by the requirements of due process are
not to be limited to oral evidence. "To attempt in this case to
distinguish what lawyers call 'real evidence' from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions."
It went on to say that coerced confessions are inadmissible even
though they may be independently established as true. "Coerced
confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency."
The court then states that the same is true here; the brutal conduct
is what offends the sense of fair play and decency. "Nothing could
be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the
temper of society."
The test laid down by the court in the opinion of this writer
is one of violence. Where the courts of the state legalize brutal
'101 Cal. app. 2d. 140, 225 P. 2d 1. 101 Cal. app. 2d. 143, 225 P. 2d. 913.
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force offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a
suspect it will be held there was a denial of "due process of law."
Now that the test has been laid down, how will it be applied?
That too, is pointed to in the decision and commented upon by
Justice Black in his concurring opinion. "The concept of due
process' of law is not final and fixed." The Court will exercise
it judgment "upon interests of society pushing in opposite directions." Due process is a continually changing concept of society
to be exercised by the court's interpretation, "mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in any progressive society."
Since "due process of law" has been said to depend on the
prevailing concept of what is fair play and since the judicial exercise of judgment cannot be frozen at one fixed stage of time,
there can be no accurate prediction of its future course.
The court has devised a constitutional tool whereby it can
temper the power of the state courts in their interpretation of the
state constitutional provisions which are the equivalent of the
second through the eighth amendments of the Federal Constitution.
To say that the decision affects only the state courts' interpretation
of self-incrimination provisions is to "mimick an ostrich." It may
be inferred from this decision that an illegal search anI seizure carried out in a violent manner and sanctioned by the court of the
state through admission of the evidence so obtained with knowledge of the manner in which it was obtained would constitute a
denial of due process.
In the recent Colorado case of Kalinback v. The People 10 the
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed a conviction where specimens
for a blood alcohol test were taken from the defendant without
objection. Mr. Justice Holland based part of his dissent upon the
contention that there had been a violation of the state constitutional
provision against self-incrimination 1,because the person had not
been informed that the evidence taken might be used against him.
He refused to recognize the difference between testimonial and
real evidence when constitutional safeguards were involved.
It is the state's prerogative to interpret its provisions against
self-incrimination. Such will not be the subject of review by the
Supreme Court of the United States unless the state court's admission of evidence amounts to a denial of due process of law.
Mr. Justice Moore dissented and wrote a very brief opinion
saying that for reasons discussed in Rochin v. California . .. it
was his opinion that the admission of this evidence (blood test)
was reversible error.
It would have been enlightening if the Justice had presented his analysis of the legal and factual similarities of the
two situations. Until this writer has been enlightened he will believe that under the Rochin case the test was that the due process
"*1951-52 CBA Adv. Sheet, p. 183, February 9, 1952.
" Sec. 18, Article 11.
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clause denies the courts the right to sanction violence and brutality
by the admission of evidence obtained by such methods. In the
Kallnback case the defendant submitted without objection to the
taking of the blood. It was taken by a physician licensed to practice in the state and at a hospital.
For theoretical purposes the Rochin case did not extend the
court's authority. It simply applied the existing right to a new
factual situation. The case was strong on its facts and it was easy
to say that if a state cannot use force to make the accused emit
thoughts from his mouth it cannot use force to make the accused
emit capsules from his stomach. For practical purposes the case
adds to the scope of due process of law as formerly applied. It
gave a definition of its scope which may result in the United States
Supreme Court's control over the state's application of certain
fundamental freedoms. The test set out will allow the states
great freedom, but when the state courts realize that the exercise
of such freedom is subject to review and scrutiny they are likely
to use that freedom more wisely.
It is the writer's opinion that all blood sample cases are not
overruled by the principal case. Only those where blood is taken
over the express objections of the accused are overruled. The objector need not resort to physical force because to do so would
bring forth the very violence the Rochin case seeks to prevent.
1
2 where the person was unconscious
Cases such as State v. Cram,"
at the time of the taking of the blood and therefore could not
object are questionable. At this date under the Rochin case it is
the writer's opinion that the cases are good law. However, the
court might adopt the minority view of State v. Cram and hold that
the taking of blood from an unconscious person is more obnoxious
(brutal) than if obtained through compulsion.
Another probable effect of this case will be that the advocates
of incorporating the entire first eight amendments within the due
process clause and of applying them directly to the states will find
that this case provides a means of alleviating the cause without
creating undue burdens upon the states.
In the case of Gallegos v. State of Nebraska,13 the United
States Supreme Court said, "So far as due process affects admissions before trial of the defendant, the accepted test is their voluntariness," citing Brown v. State of Mississippi14 as one of the
authorities for the statement. The question arises then whether
the test is one of voluntariness or one of violence. The answer
seems clear from the facts of the case and the conclusion of the
court that violence or the lack of it was the test of the voluntary
nature of the admissions and plea. The only question before the
court was,
Are confessions and a plea obtained from a prisoner during a period of twenty-five days of illegal deten176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d. 283, 164 A.L.R. 952.
1372 S. Ct. 141 (1951).

",See, supra, note 7.
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tion by federal and state officers before being brought
before a magistrate and before counsel is appointed to
assist the prisoner admissible in evidence?
The court answered the question in the affirmative, holding
that the admission of such testimony was not a denial of due
process of law. The court checked the testimony very closely to
determine whether or not violence had been committed upon the
defendant. They found as a matter of fact that no violence was
used to obtain the confessions and plea and that the mere illegal
detention was not enough to invalidate the proceedings in which
the confessions were admitted into evidence. The fact that the
defendant was charged with murder did not alter the ruling because there was no abuse or the threat of it.
It can be seen that while the court announced the test as
being one of voluntariness, the evidence obtained from the defendant was held not to have been involuntarily given because of the
lack of violence. This writer concludes that the true test must be
whether or not the facts show that at the time the evidence was
obtained from the defendant he was subjected to violence or the
immediate threat of it.
GEORGE HOLLY.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-USE IN STATE COURTS OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE.-Having read the comment on Rochin v. People of California you may think there should be a way around the entire
difficulty. While we offer no hope of an easy solution we think a
near approach was made in the case of Stefanelli v. Minard,'
which is the subject of this comment.
Not long ago someone suggested in a note in Case and Comment that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure might
be kept out of state courts by petitioning a federal district court
to enjoin its use under authority of the Civil Rights Act, which
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in any action at 2law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
We thought this a rather brilliant suggestion, as did Stefanelli and Malanga, who were about to be convicted of bookmaking
with the air of certain incriminating property which the State of
Stefanelli v. Minard, 72 S. Ct. 118.
R.S. § 1979, 8 U.S.C. § 43, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43..
Jurisdiction Is Founded On 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3).
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New Jersey had admittedly obtained through unlawful search and
seizure. These worthies petitioned the Federal District Court in
equity for suppression of this evidence, maintaining that an injunction was a proper redress within Sec. 1979 (supra).
The petition was dismissed, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. That court, Justice
Frankfurter delivering the opinion, assaulted the question as
follows:
This act has given rise to differences of application
here. Such differences inhere in the attempt to construe
the remaining fragments of a comprehensive enactment,
dismembered by partial repeal and invalidity, loosely and
blindly drafted in the first instance, and drawing on the
whole Constitution itself for its scope and meaning . . .
however, the Court's lodestar of adjudication has been
that the statute "should be construed so as to respect the
proper balance between the States and the federal government in law enforcement." . . . Discretionary refusal to exercise equitable power under the Act to interfere with State criminal prosecution is one of the devices we have sanctioned for preserving this balance.
The court notes that it is not deciding whether or not the
complaint stated a cause of action under Sec. 1979, for even if
the action was perfectly good, "to sustain the claim would disregard the power of courts of equity to exercise discretion when,
as a matter of equity jurisdiction, the balance is against the wisdom of using their power." The Court carefully refrains from
indicating what its decision would be had the district court taken
jurisdiction. While the Constitutional validity of the action is still
an open question, however, the frame of mind of the Supreme
Court in the matter is not. The opinion states on page 121 that
courts of equity should refuse to interfere with or embarrass
threatened proceedings in state courts "save in those exceptional
cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent . . . No
such irreparable injury, clear and imminent, is threatened here.
At worst, the evidence . . . may provide the basis for conviction
of the petitioners."
In the inevitable Horrible Consequences section of the opinion
Mr. Justice Frankfurter adds his final filip:
If we were to sanction this interview ... Every question of procedural due process of law . . . would invite
a flanking movement against the system of State courts
by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be
to this court . . . (citing examples) . . . To suggest these
difficulties is to recognize their solution.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented briefly on the ground of his
dissent in Wolf v. Colorado. We think this settles the question.
WALLACE L. VANDER JAGT.

